1.7 KiB
1.7 KiB
WBV2-P6-001 status
- task:
WBV2-P6-001 - parent:
WBV2-P5-003 - parity:
SECURITY.SCRIPTING - implementationClass:
EXCLUDED - status:
done - fixture:
tests/files/web/generated/WBV2-P6-001-SECURITY.SCRIPTING.blend
Evidence
- Blender desktop and WASM/Main expose the same read-only scripting policy receipt: autorun, network, add-on, driver-expression and module execution default to
DENY. - The receipt records a disabled sandbox, cancellation code
SCRIPT_SANDBOX_CANCELLED, idempotent disposal stateRELEASED, bounded budgets, and blocked DOM/worker/storage/network scope. - A malicious Text source remains metadata-only; module autorun, unsigned execution, approved-key sandbox execution, late sandbox results, and filesystem escape are all rejected without publishing or changing Main.
- The policy Text and script source survive desktop and WASM save/reopen exactly. The updated C++ reader defines a typed
scriptingPolicysnapshot field; the checked-in vendor WASM exposes the same canonical receipt throughtextsuntil rebuilt.
Commands
build_blender_5.2.0/bin/blender -b --factory-startup --python tools/web/generated/WBV2-P6-001.py -- tests/files/web/generated/WBV2-P6-001-SECURITY.SCRIPTING.blendbuild_blender_5.2.0/bin/blender -b --factory-startup --python tools/web/check-wbv2-p6-001-desktop.py -- tests/files/web/generated/WBV2-P6-001-SECURITY.SCRIPTING.blend tests/golden/WBV2-P6-001/scripting-desktop-report.jsonnode --check tools/web/check-generated-gap.mjsnpm --prefix web run test:generated-gap -- --task WBV2-P6-001node tools/web/check-generated-gap.mjs --task WBV2-P6-001
Handoff
- nextTask:
WBV2-P6-002 - queue mutation: allowed after manifest and parent hash validation